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Two broad concepts have begun to permeate U.S. military strategic planning since
the end of the Gulf War: the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and dominant
battlespace awareness (DBA). An RMA represents a basic change in the conduct of
warfare which incorporates new technologies, operational innovation and organizational
changes. DBA refers to the military's ability to efficiently obtain and effectively use
information to dominate an opposing force. This thesis is a study of a stylized warfare
scenario involving elements of DBA and RMA. Specifically, U.S. attack aircraft attempt
to prevent enemy transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) from harassing neighboring
countries with theater ballistic missiles. The U.S. aircraft may be aided by use of
unattended ground sensors (UGSs); the enemy TEL activities are correspondingly
enhanced by decoy TELs. The model described allows the combat advantage of each side
to be quantitatively compared. Trend analysis demonstrates the benefits of deception and
the potential of UGSs.
VI
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The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may not
have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within the
time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic errors, they
cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without verification is
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Two broad concepts have begun to permeate U.S. military strategic planning since
the end of the GulfWar: the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and dominant battlespace
awareness (DBA). An RMA represents a basic change in the conduct of warfare which
incorporates new technologies, operational innovation and organizational changes. Admiral
William A. Owens, the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has forcefully
called attention to the nature of the current RMA, and the challenges and opportunities it
presents to the U.S. His framework for the design of U.S. forces centered around three
concepts: battlespace awareness, advanced C4I, and precision force use. The intersection of
battlespace awareness and advanced C4I yields the term dominant battlespace awareness
(DBA). DBA refers to the military's ability to efficiently obtain and effectively use
information to dominate an opposing force.
This thesis is a study of a stylized warfare scenario involving elements ofDBA and
RMA. Specifically, U.S. attack aircraft attempt to prevent enemy transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) from harassing neighboring countries with theater ballistic missiles. The
U.S. aircraft may be aided by use of unattended ground sensors (UGSs); the enemy TEL
activities are correspondingly enhanced by decoy TELs. A computer simulation is
developed in which U.S. forces operate with limited DBA and enemy forces experience the
first stages of an RMA.
Xlll
Two simplified and computationally tractable analytical models based upon the
methodology of the simulation are formulated to supplement the simulation. Numerical
results from the analytical models and the simulation are contrasted and compared to gain
insight into expected behavior of the simulation. The analytical models help to explain the
simulation output and provide numerical bounds on simulation results for the input
parameters used in the comparison.
Results are generated from input parameters for four comparison cases. First the
model is run with aircraft searching for TELs. The second case adds decoy TELs that
remain visible throughout the simulation in an attempt to absorb attacks from the aircraft.
In the third case the decoy TELs are not present and the aircraft search for TELs with the
assistance of a UGS network. All four components are included (TELs, decoy TELs,
aircraft and UGS) in the final comparison case.
Examination ofthe output from the analytical model or the simulation is in terms of
two measures of effectiveness (MOEs). The first is based on the length of time until the
aggressor nation chooses to cease hostilities. In this model the TELs continue to conduct
attacks until all TELs have been destroyed. The time until the last TEL is destroyed is called
the survival time. The first MOE provided will be an estimator of the expected survival
time. The second MOE is based on the total number of theater ballistic missiles launched
by the TELs during hostilities. The simulation determines an estimator of the expected total
number of launches.
XIV
The results of any simulation are dependent on the simulation itself and thus are not
presented as predictions but used to highlight important trends. There are two important
trends demonstrated from the output of the simulation. First, the importance of deception
in warfare (especially to those seeking to deceive U.S. forces) is reinforced. Second, the
unattended ground sensor system modeled in the simulation provides an enhanced capability





Two broad concepts have begun to permeate U.S. military strategic planning since
the end ofthe Gulf War: the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and dominant battlespace
awareness (DBA). An RMA represents a basic change in the conduct of warfare which
incorporates new technologies, operational innovation and organizational changes. Admiral
William A. Owens, the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has forcefully
called attention to the nature of the current RMA, and the challenges and opportunities it
presents to the U.S. His framework for the design of U.S. forces centered around three
concepts: battlespace awareness, advanced C4I, and precision force use. The intersection of
battlespace awareness and advanced C4I yields the term dominant battlespace awareness
(DBA). DBA refers to the military's ability to efficiently obtain and effectively use
information to dominate an opposing force.
When considering this revolution, it is important to note that not only United States
forces are permitted to experience the technological change associated with an RMA. A
revolution in military affairs may occur in any nation. It has been proposed that the United
States will experience this revolution sooner than the rest of the world (Owens, 1995).
While most agree that the United States has the best opportunity to promote a new RMA,
other nations will seek to enhance their military effectiveness to the best of their abilities.
U.S. military thinkers should thus consider other nations' ability to develop revolutionary
capabilities.
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Post-Gulf-War analysis indicates the threat of mobile theater ballistic missiles
(TBMs) is still substantial. Although coalition forces in the Gulf War had air superiority,
the sorties flown with TBM missions did not prove to be an effective system for locating the
transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that serve as the mobile platform for TBMs (Cohen,
1993). As nations promote the "TBM revolution," the U.S. should devote increased
attention to countering TELs and other such weapon systems. Much of the initial countering
effort of the GulfWar focused on post-launch interception of TBMs. As demonstrated by
Ehlers (1992), a reduction in TBM effectiveness can be achieved by focusing on destroying
the launch platform. Actions to neutralize an adversary's TBM capability are known as
attack operations. There have been several proposals for a system of unattended ground
sensors (UGSs) to detect enemy TELs (Berhow, 1993 and Junker, 1995). Developed during
the Vietnam War, UGS technology matured. Under the premise that U.S. forces will operate
with DBA, a system of UGSs that trigger attack aircraft would seem to be useful for
combating the threat of mobile TBMs.
B. THESIS SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This thesis is a study of a stylized warfare scenario involving elements ofDBA and
RMA. Specifically, U.S. attack aircraft attempt to prevent enemy transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) from harassing neighboring countries with theater ballistic missiles. The
U.S. aircraft may be aided by use of unattended ground sensors (UGSs); the enemy TEL
activities are correspondingly enhanced by decoy TELs. A computer simulation is
developed in which U.S. forces operate with limited DBA and enemy forces experience the
first stages of an RMA.
II. SHAPING THE REVOLUTION
A. A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
A nation's realization that a revolution in military affairs has occurred often is only
achieved in hindsight. The proponents of the current RMA discussion theorize that, with the
foresight of the coming revolution, the United States can place itselfon the cutting edge of
the revolution's promotion. The standard indications that an RMA is occurring are advances
in the technology of warfare. Technological development alone does not provide a
guarantee of victory in war. Changes in the way a military is organized and conducts
operations with this technology allow that nation to participate in the revolution.
There are three preconditions to the emergence of an RMA (Fitzsimonds, 1 994):
Technological Development - Intuitively the most obvious requirement to initiate
an RMA. Technological development has grown exponentially since the dawn
of the Industrial Revolution. New military technology does not come fully
integrated into a military system.
Operational Innovation - How to best employ the potential of any military system
is never immediately known. Military organizations devote considerable energy
toward devising doctrine for new technologies to avoid trial by fire.
Organizational Adaptation - Given the static nature of any bureaucracy, a
nation's military must experience a cultural change when incorporating new
technologies and operational capabilities.
The three primary preconditions listed above must occur in concert for an RMA to
truly take place. Additionally, the revolution need not occur during actual hostilities and in
fact generally occurs during periods of peace (Fitzsimonds, 1994). With the Persian Gulf
War fading farther into history, the United States seems to have entered just such a period.
If the United States has truly entered its own RMA, what form will U.S. forces take
to meet the challenges of this revolution? A prominent architect of a framework for the
discussion has been Admiral William A. Owens, former Vice Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs
of Staff. He has advocated shaping future U.S. forces in terms of desired capabilities rather
than threat. As a proponent of the idea that the U.S. is currently experiencing a revolution
in military affairs, he has pointed to three areas of emerging technology (Owens, 1995):
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
• Advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(Advanced C4I)
• Precision-guided munitions (PGMs)
Continuing to define his vision, Admiral Owens viewed the technologies mentioned
above as a new "System of Systems." The system architecture comprises three primary
concepts (Figure 1
.):
• Battlespace Awareness involves the technologies associated with ISR. These
systems are responsible for providing tactical commanders with a picture of the
battlefield. Also included is information concerning weather, terrain, and
electromagnetic characteristics of the area.
• Advanced C41 systems are those that handle data and information transfer. This
information is critical to a commander for it provides increased awareness of
enemy intentions and actions. Friendly forces also benefit as increased
understanding leads to efficient target identification and assignment.
• Precision Force Use is primarily concerned with the use of precision guided
weapon technology. As military thinkers have promoted the notion of an RMA,
precision force use has also come to include our ability to coordinate the first two
concepts into precise offensive action.
Battlespace Awareness
Dominant
Battle S^ ^\ Battlespace
Assessment / \ Awareness
Precision _4T
Force Use V V / i Advanced C 1
Mission Assignment
Figure 1. The framework for discussion ofUnited States participation in a revolution in
military affairs (Owens, 1995).
At the intersection of each of these core concepts are three secondary concepts.
Drawn from the definitions provided previously each can be summarized by the following:
Mission Assignment - refers to the ability to assign targets to weapon systems.
Often called "Good Targeting," it calls for an effective link of sensor to shooter.
Battle Assessment - represents an ability to accurately determine the outcome of
any attack. This has been called "Good Bomb Damage Assessment."
Dominant Battlespace Awareness (DBA) - The capability to achieve real-time,
all weather, continuous surveillance in and over a large geographical area that is
sufficient to determine the presence, movement, and state of objects, emissions,
activities or events of military interest. Simply said, DBA represents "Good
Knowledge."
B. THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION
As stated previously this thesis is concerned with examining an aspect of the
revolution in military affairs as it affects both the United States and any potential adversary.
Although there are ample areas for study, this thesis focuses on two technologies. The first
is best described as a threat technology. Ballistic missiles are the threat of concern,
specifically mobile theater ballistic missiles. The second technology of interest is part of
attack operations. The focus here is on the use of unattended ground sensors in a real-time
cueing network for overhead attack aircraft.
1. Defining the Threat
When providing the framework for the presumed threat technology, one must begin
with a justification establishing the importance of the technologies considered. This section
begins with a brief discussion of missile proliferation. Then the current threat is depicted
with the goal of establishing the basis for a TBM revolution.
Since the end of the Gulf War, U.S. military strategists have conducted many
analyses assessing the effect of air power against mobile TBMs. There seems to be a lack
ofa consensus on whether the TBM defense effort was a success. Regardless, TBM attacks
were top stories for the media and a constant concern for coalition forces throughout the war.
This high-level exposure will fuel many nations' desire to enhance both their offensive and
defensive TBM capabilities.
There are many reasons why nations might aspire to a TBM capability. TBMs
provide an ability to attack targets at long range with little notice. Secondly, TBMs are
difficult to destroy following launch. Lastly, TBMs are able to carry conventional, chemical,
or nuclear ordnance. These capabilities provide a nation with an easy method of inducing
instability into world affairs. (Navias, 1990)
The list of countries with known tactical systems is presented as Appendix A
(Berhow, 1993). While no nation in particular should be viewed as a potential U.S.
adversary, this table certainly illustrates the influence the TBM threat may have on future
world affairs. One must also remember that these countries and others are actively seeking
to improve their TBM capability.
An example of the current TBM state of affairs was presented by Hair (1993):
The MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) is the primary launch and
support vehicle for the SS-1B (Scud-A), SS-1C (Scud-B), and SS-12
(Scaleboard) surface-to-surface missiles. The vehicle is 12m long and with
the missile it weighs 29,000 kg. It has a crew of 4, is capable of 60kph on
hard surfaces and has a range of 1500km. Its 525hp diesel engine and 8-
wheel drive system allow it to operate over rugged terrain but at the expense
of speed and range.
A "TBM revolution" would promote across the board improvements to TBMs.
Missile accuracy will certainly improve. Increasing ranges and payloads will add to the
lethality of these weapons. The TELs which serve as the launch platform may become
increasingly mobile, diminishing the impact of terrain.
2. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGSs)
The use ofan unmanned remote sensing system for the cueing of response forces has
a fairly recent history. Development of an unattended ground sensor system was begun
during the Vietnam War in 1 966 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The sensors
were to be part of a system designed to track movement of enemy forces, termed the
"McNamara Line." The sensors' use increased: both for offense and defense. For example,
they provided an early warning against surprise attack during Khe Sanh. Attack aircraft
were given assignments of targets on the Ho Chi Minh trail based upon sensor reports.
These sensors were largely considered a success by the military, although there are some
who would prefer to say "limited" success. (Dickson, 1 976)
Unattended ground sensor systems have continued to be developed over the last
twenty years. These systems have found a natural home with the Army and Marine Corps.
The Army currently uses the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Area Sensor System
(REMBASS) and recently the Marine Corps fielded the Tactical Remote Sensor System
(TRSS). Both of these systems have the mission of providing information to tactical
commanders about the movements of enemy forces within those commanders' areas of
interest.
These systems attempt to detect and classify force elements that pass near the
sensors. UGSs have the potential to exploit a variety of target signatures, for example:
acoustic, infrared, magnetic, optical, and seismic. The classification capability is limited to
determining the difference between dismounted infantry and vehicles. A general UGS
system consists of its detectors, a transmitter/relay system, and a monitoring station. The
detection through relay components are limited by battery lifetime. Research into improved
UGS systems continues, but to-date no system has the ability to provide real-time target
classification information to on-station attack aircraft, (van Kan, 1 994)
The proposals for incorporating UGS systems into attack operations are varied but
contain two main themes. The first theme, represented by Berhow (1 993), is that the desired
function of UGSs is as a warning mechanism in previously determined threat areas. The
largest amount of effort is devoted to determining where TEL activity is the highest and
placing sensors in those areas. The second theme, contained in the Junker thesis (1995), is
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that the focus ofthe effort should be entirely along roadways and intersections. He suggests
that a further research area would be to provide a decision support aid for UGS placement
based upon network theory.
A "UGS revolution" would certainly provide enhanced capabilities vital to the
counter TBM effort. Extended battery lifetimes would enable sensors to be placed in areas
not yet believed to contain TELs. Longer detection ranges and enhanced data transmission
ability are capabilities that are certain to develop. The ability of these sensors to correctly





The purpose of this section is to paint the picture of a warfare scenario which projects
the military forces involved into a post-RMA environment. The concept is fashioned after
littoral warfare in general, yet applies to many warfare operations. An aggressor nation
bordering international waters, seeking to promote regional instability, has begun to actively
deploy TELs. U.S. National Command Authority has directed forces to the area in an
attempt to deter aggression. Carrier-based attack aircraft arrive in theater with a mission of
conducting attack operations. Following a brief prehostility phase, fighting begins.
When modeling theater-level war there are many components and decisions that
must be made as to which warfare components are desired. Because of the scope of this
thesis, the warfare scenario explained above may be simply viewed as a "cat and mouse"
game between attack aircraft and TELs. In order to explore further the implications of
Dominant Battlespace Awareness other players will be added to the game. TEL decoys will
add a deception element to the scenario for the aggressor nation. A UGS sensor network will
increase awareness for the units conducting attack operations.
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Every model depends heavily on its construction and input parameters and the model
to be developed in the following paragraphs is certainly no different. This model does not
attempt to predict or quantify exactly what outcome to expect. Rather, its results are
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designed to provide insight into what the author believes are issues that should be included
in any discussion of an RMA.
The first set of model assumptions center on the theater of operations themselves.
The model assumes that Dominant Battlespace Awareness should cover a 200 mile by 200
mile region (Gordon, 1 994). This model further assumes the terrain to be uniform or very
nearly uniform (like a coastal plain or desert), thus having minimal impact on the outcome.
There are several key assumptions for the U.S. forces in the scenario. The first is that
the concept ofDBA allows for attack aircraft to be aware of the presence and state ofenemy
air defenses. For this reason, attack aircraft do not experience attrition in the present model.
Secondly, U.S. dominance at sea is assumed so there is no naval interaction in this model.
Finally, the model also does not permit attack forces to follow a strategy of using overhead
assets to enhance their knowledge. This includes intelligence gathering during the
prehostility phase as well as the identification ofTELs immediately following a TBM launch
(also known as the "flaming datum strategy").
The most important assumptions pertain to the aggressor nation. This model assumes
that this nation has experienced an RMA so that its TELs have improved capabilities.
Specifically:
The aggressor nation has developed a system of hidden logistic bases. This nation
is also aware of U.S. desire to exploit existing roadways in their search efforts.
Thus, the TELs have enhanced off-road capability. TELs have advanced
camouflage abilities and can remain hidden from search efforts while waiting to
launch their TBM.
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• The TELs operate with an advanced command and control capability. There is
no formal command structure for attack operations to exploit. TELs essentially
operate independently and their logistic support structure is always able to meet
their demands.
• The aggressor nation has complete knowledge of remaining TEL capabilities and
will continue to fight until all TELs are destroyed.
• The aggressor nation does not have an ability to reinforce the area with additional
TELs.
The last two assumptions can be easily modified in the simulation to provide for TEL
reinforcement or a different end of hostilities criteria (such as percentage of TEL force
remaining).
C. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Appendix C contains the program used in this thesis. This section highlights the
basic functionality of each of the entities represented in the program. The simulation was
written in the MODSIM II®
,
a modular, object-oriented simulation language.
1. Attack Aircraft
Because an assessment of attack aircraft is beyond the scope of this thesis, the attack
aircraft do not represent a particular type of aircraft, but rather an attack capability. Aircraft
are located on board a stationary aircraft carrier and operate in only two dimensions. There
is no explicit modeling of altitudes or attack profiles. Figure 2 is used to illustrate the
fundamental properties of aircraft interaction in the simulation. In a basic scenario (one in
which UGSs have not been introduced) an attack aircraft will receive an initial search datum
determined uniformly at random over the operational area (Op Area). The aircraft will fly
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to that point to begin a random search. The aircraft will conduct a search of a circular area
and the outcome of the search will trigger one oftwo responses:
• No Target is found - the aircraft will move forward a distance equal to twice its
attack radius and conduct a second search. This motion is modeled to ensure that
glimpse regions do not overlap. The search movement is only permitted if the
unit has remaining on-station time. When there is no on-station time remaining,
the aircraft returns to the carrier. The pattern of an aircraft's search is referred to
as a.forward 2-R random search.
• A Target is Found - the aircraft conducts one attack and returns to the carrier.
The determination of a successful attack is encapsulated as a single probability








Move 2 RAttaclc & Search 4
Figure 2. Fundamental Procedure for Aircraft Interaction.
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Upon return the aircraft must wait for a turnaround time to expire before obtaining
its next assignment. While this certainly is not the only possible rules for aircraft actions,
but the aircraft in this model have a primary purpose of force attenuation. Research into
improved search tactics with UGS networks and bomb damage assessment are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
In a scenario in which UGS networks are present, the aircraft can receive target
assignment either on takeoff from the carrier or during flight. An aircraft which returns to
base with pending assignments transfers those assignments (without a transmission time
delay) to the aircraft which is closest to the datum.
It is important to emphasize that the aircraft in this simulation are designed to operate
independently from other aircraft. This feature was produced intentionally in order to
approximate a continuous coverage capability, an assumed feature ofa 'Dominant' system.
When aircraft are first created, each receives the same values for fundamental characteristics
such as on-station time. This deterministic approach coupled with the methodology of
returning to the carrier after a single attack, induces cyclic behavior in aircraft attack
frequency. This issue will be further explained in Chapter IV, when the simulation is
compared to two analytical models.
2. UGS Network
The most important characterization ofthe unattended ground sensors is that sensor
networks are modeled, not individual sensors. Thus a detection radius of one mile, for




There are several descriptive parameters used by the model. These parameters are
not intended to be totally faithful to reality, only to provide a general sense of it. Yet, they
do provide a reasonably detailed description ofthe scenarios considered in this thesis. Table
1 illustrates the primary components and their associated parameters:
Component Associated Parameters








Unattended Ground Sensor Network Sensor Range
Number of Sensor Networks





Minimum Number of Logistic Bases
Logistic Base Factor
TEL Decoys Number ofDecoys
Normal Speed
Operating Area Range of Boundaries
Number ofDays in Prehostility Phase
Table 1 . Simulation Model Input Parameters.
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Before beginning a detailed discussion of the results of the model an attempt should
be made to gain insight into the computer simulation. Two simplified and computationally
tractable analytical models based upon the methodology of the simulation are formulated.
The analytical models and the simulation are contrasted and compared. The simulation is
then used to generate scenario outcomes.
The simulation is discussed in terms of four comparison cases. First the model is run
with aircraft searching for TELs. The second case adds decoy TELs that remain visible
throughout the simulation in an attempt to absorb attacks from the aircraft. In the third case
the decoy TELs are not present and the aircraft search for TELs with the assistance of a UGS
network. Finally, all four components are included (TELs, decoy TELs, aircraft and UGSs)
in the final comparison case. The comparison cases are summarized in Table 2.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Aircraft • • • •
TELs • • • •
Decoy TELs • •
UGSs • •
Table 2. Comparison Cases for Simulation.
Examination ofthe output from the analytical model or the simulation is in terms of
two measures of effectiveness (MOEs). The first is based on the length of time until the
aggressor nation chooses to cease hostilities. In this model the TELs continue to conduct
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attacks until all TELs have been destroyed. The time from the end ofthe prehostility phase
(during which the TELs exhibit aggressive behavior but do not launch TBMs) until the last
TEL is destroyed will be called the survival time. Thus, the first MOE provided will be an
estimator of the expected survival time. The second MOE is based on the total number of
TBMs launched by the TELs during hostilities. The simulation will determine an estimator
of the expected total number ofTEL launches until the last is destroyed.
A. ANALYTICAL MODELS
The simulation designed for this thesis was done with the specific purpose of
examining issues within the concept of dominant battlespace awareness. Laying the
groundwork for the results that follow is best done when the results are first compared
against a realization of what one might expect to happen. The analytical models presented
here will provide a measure of validity and serve as bounds on the functional form of the
MOE's.
1. The Independent Markovian Model
Assume B aircraft search a region of size A square miles seeking to destroy R TELs.
The aircraft operate independently from one another and follow a random search pattern. At
each instant oftime a circular area is searched with a given attack radius and upon detection
the target is destroyed with some probability, p. In continuous time assume that the
probability an aircraft discovers and subsequently destroys a TEL in time (t , t + dt) is equal
to A.(B) R dt. Let X(B) be the rate of TEL destruction, a linear function of the number of
aircraft searching (the specifics of determining A are presented in the pages to follow). Also
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assume that only one TEL destruction may occur in any (short) period oflength dt and that
the probability ofTEL destruction in these periods are independent. We would now expect
that the time for the first TEL to be destroyed will occur according to an exponential
distribution with mean . Now there are (R-l) TELs remaining. Then under the
X(JS)'R
current assumptions the next TEL will be destroyed after an independent exponential time
with mean . This process will continue until the last TEL is destroyed after
exponential time . Let random the variable T, represent the time for the destruction of
the ith TEL. The variable T represents the total time required for the destruction of all TELs.
Thus, the random variable T can be expressed as




+ ... + TR . (1)
Since T is a sum of exponential random variables its expected value is simply determined:
E[T\B,R] = E[T
X
] * E[T2] * E[T3] ... + E[TR] (2)
*P-I*fl -
»fe li £ - * « (3)
The right-hand side of this equation approaches ln(K) as R becomes large. The
functional form ofthis equation is such that the expected time is a monotonically increasing
function but with decreasing marginal rates as R increases. This expected shape of the
survival time curve will resurface when this is compared to simulation output.
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The analytical model described also has basic functionality when seeking to describe
the expected total number ofTBM launches conducted by TELs during hostilities. Adhering
to the same set of assumptions for the destruction rate, assume that TELs launch TBMs
according to a launch rate 1/T. Then with L, representing the number of launches from the








+ [LR ] = -J— . (4)
T"A(i>)
The expected total number of launches as shown above is linear with respect to R.
Of primary concern at this point is the determination of the destruction rate, A(B).
It is likely that A(B) = AKILL • B to a very good approximation, where X^^ depends on model
parameters. Based upon the actions of the unit components from the simulation there are 3
parameters that will be used to construct the kill rate. These parameters are
• YDetect ' Detection Rate.
• PiciLLiDetect - Probability of Kill given TEL has been detected.
• rv
- Long Run Probability TEL is visible.
Determining Y Detect depends upon the methodology of aircraft movement within the
simulation. Each aircraft has a flight cycle consisting of three parts: transit between the
carrier and the operational area (Op Area), searching for TELs on station in the Op Area, and
a transitional period following the aircraft's return to the carrier. Designating the total time
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to complete this cycle as C, aircraft cycle time is expressed as




* CVTurnAround ' (5)
During this cycle time, while on-station over the region, the aircraft performs its
forward 2-R random search. The search algorithm permits a single discrete "cookie cutter"
glimpse before initiating the on station time. Thus during its on station time an aircraft
(searching with velocity, v^ searches N circles with an attack radius rAttack . The area visited
during a cycle is found
T










A = f 1 +
OnStation ,2A








The AiQydg is then divided by the total area, ATotal to obtain the coverage factor, CF. In order
to transform the dimensionless coverage factor into a coverage rate divide by the cycle time,
CF
C. Thus y Detect = —.
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The probability of kill given detect, P^l
|
Dtxect , is an input parameter. If a TEL is
within the attack radius of the aircraft and is visible the aircraft detects the TEL. The
proportion of time the TEL is visible is a function of the time the TEL is transiting between





The time the TEL is moving depends on the simulation methodology and input parameters.
The TEL is hidden during the waiting period to launch a TBM and the reloading period at
a logistic base. The three parameters are combined to produce the kill rate as
""KILL
: YDetect'PKILL \ Detect' rv ' (10)
As mentioned previously the analytical model also depends on the determination of
the launch rate, T. An individual TEL launch cycle has four components:
• Visit to Logistic Base (Initial or Reload)
• Travel to Hiding Point
• Waiting to Launch TBM
• Travel to Logistic Base
These components occur in a time that is directly determined randomly from a distribution
(logistic base visits and waiting periods) or a time that depends upon the randomness ofthe
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simulation locations (travel times). An estimate of this launch cycle time is found to be
E[x] •- E[T
ReloaJ + E[TTraveltoHjde ] + E[TWaiting \ + E\JTrmeltoBase \ . (H)
2. The Wave Model
This model assumes that the aircraft conduct attack operations as a group or wave
ofB aircraft. The aircraft search a region of size A square miles seeking to destroy R TELs.
An individual aircraft with an attack radius, rAttack , attack velocity, v^ , and an on-station
time, Tq,, Station , searches the same number of circles, N, was first presented in Equation 6.
Thus, the B aircraft in the wave search n sub-regions found as
T








n = N-B . (13)
The B aircraft have a probability of killing a TEL found in one ofthe n regions that
depends upon several other probabilities. First, the TEL must be present in the sub-region









The probability any one of R TELs is present in an aircraft's search sub-region is
D
PPresent (^) = — i^s assumes R is small enough compared to t, and that no two (or more)
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. Finally an aircraft
destroys a detected TEL with probability/^
.^^ . These supporting probabilities are used
to produce the probability a TEL is killed,
* KilA"-) ~ * Kill\Detect ' * Detect | Visible ' Y Visible] Present '
*
Present^*-' ' (16)
The probability that none ofR TELs are killed during a wave's on-station time is
P(£) = [\-Pm {R)r . (17)
Now let TK be the time until some TEL is killed and let m(R) represent E[TK \ R] ; note that
this is conditional on there begin R TELs present initially. One would expect this time to
reflect the probability of killing a TEL as well as the time the wave spends in transition to
the Op Area, TA . Assuming that when a TEL is killed the entire wave returns and that
Ton station / 2 is the mean time the TEL is killed given the TEL will be killed,
28
m{R) = TA * {T0nStation * m(R)yHR) * -2^.(1 - pW) . (18)
Solving for m(R),
„/ D \ ^ OnStation rl/v * OnStation ,- «.miK) = 1 . + + . (19)
With the foundation built by the previous equations, T, the expected time to kill all R TELS
is found as
T = m(R) + m(R-\) + m(R-2) + ... + m{\) . (20)
An analytical estimate for the second MOE, the expected number of launches may
be formulated in several steps. Retaining m(R) as the expected time for any ofthe R TELs
to be destroyed by the wave, the expected number ofTBM launches from any individual
TEL, during m(R) depends upon the launch cycle time, x, and equals —-—- . Since there
T
are R TELs, the expected number of launches is —- . Each successive TEL
x
destruction reduces R while x is assumed to remain constant. Finding the expected total
number ofTBM launches, L, is found to be
E[L] = R
'm(R) + (*-l)-"»(*-l) + (R-2)-m(R-2) + + w(l)
X X X X
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The two models formulated in the previous sections each represent a different
methodology for the aircraft conducting attack operations against TELs. The first model
reflected a continuous random search by aircraft operating completely independently of one
another. This model will be referred to as the "independent model." The second model,
termed the "wave model," represented aircraft operating as a wave. Each of these models
will serve to bound the simulation results as is shown in the next section. The two models
are based on assumptions that, in effect, surround the way in which the simulation is now
programmed to function.
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B. COMPARISON OF SIMULATION AND ANALYTICAL MODELS
The analytical models will be used to generate results based upon the set of
parameters shown in Table 3.
Parameter Value
Number ofTELs lto 19 by 3
TEL Normal Speed 15 mph
TEL Evasion Speed 25 mph
Mean Hiding Time 8.0 hours
Mean Reload Time 3.0 hours
Min Number ofLogistic Bases 1
Logistic Base Factor 5




Aircraft Velocity 400 mph
Attack Radius 10.0 miles
On Station Time 2.0 hours
Turn Around Time 3.0 hours
Op Area Size 200 x 200 sq. miles
CV Location 125 miles off coast
Table 3 . Input Parameters for Analytical Model.
The input parameters ofTable 3 are used in accordance with the previous discussion
to determine the desired analytical model values, with two exceptions. The expected TEL
travel times and the aircraft back and forth times are dependent upon distances between
random locations. The distributions ofthese distances are not easily determined. Estimators
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of their expected value can be easily obtained by running a separate mathematical
simulation. Figure 5 presents, as an example, the results of one such simulation. The





















Figure 5. Simulated Distribution ofMean Travel Distance.





Using the mean TEL travel distance of 104.5 shown in Figure 5, the expected value of
launch cycle time, T, is found as




Table 4 illustrates the values calculated in accordance with the previous equations
from the input parameters for the independent model. Those parameters that are dependent
upon the number ofTELs or the number of aircraft are not included in this table.
Parameter Calculated Value
*H * Back and Forth Travel J 5.625 hours
c 6.125 hours
N 41 circular search areas
" Cycle 128880.53 sq. miles
CF 0.322
Y Detect 0.0526




Table 4. Independent Model Calculated Parameters.
Table 5 displays the calculated values for the wave model. The probability of
detection given a TEL is visible is assumed to be 1.0. The parameters that are dependent
upon the number ofTELs or the number of aircraft in the wave are not included in Table 5.
Parameter Calculated Value
N 41 circular search areas
t 127.32 sub-regions for TELs
r Visible | Present 0.503
TA 4.0 hrs
T 22.15 hrs
Table 5. Wave Model Calculated Parameters.
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The analytical model and the simulation results are compared using the previously
defined MOE's: expected survival time and expected total number of launches. Figures 6,
7, and 8 present results for the simulation and the analytical models across several levels for
number of aircraft and TELs. The functional form of the analytical models and the
simulation are similar and the results agree for low numbers of TELs or aircraft. As TELS
increase the expected survival time of the last TEL is greatly affected when one aircraft is














Figure 6. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected

















Figure 7. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot ofthe Expected


















Figure 8. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Survival Time based upon the Wave Model.
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Figure 9 provides a two dimensional view for three aircraft against increasing levels
of TELs. Recall that the purpose of this comparison is to provide a sense of the functional
form ofthe simulation results. The simulation does exhibit a decreasing marginal return for
additional hostile forces if those forces measure their success by the length of the TBM
campaign. The analytical models provide an upper and lower bound for the simulation.
Simulation vs Analytical Models























Simulation- • - Independent Model—.-Wave Model
Figure 9. Comparison of Simulation versus Analytical Models for Fixed
Level of Three Aircraft.
Although TEL forces experience a decreasing marginal return for survival time with
the addition of TELs into the region, Figures 10, 11, and 12 illustrate the impact of more
TELs into the region on the total number of launches. The analytical models and the














Figure 10. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot ofthe Expected














Figure 1 1 . Three-Dimensional Surface Plot ofthe Expected












7 Number of TELs
Number of A/C
Figure 12. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot ofthe Expected
Number of Launches based upon the Wave Model.
Figure 1 3 compares the expected number of TBM launches from the simulation
against the analytical models. Again there is close agreement for small numbers of TELs
and aircraft. The plot of the simulation results shows an increasing marginal return as TELs
are increased. The wave model has a curve with a similar form. This phenomenon seems
to indicate that the aircraft system experiences diminishing effectiveness as the number of
potential targets is increased. The analytical models again serve to bound the simulation
results above and below and provide a measure of construct validity. The functional form








Simulation vs Analytical Models
Number of Aircraft = 3
-Simulation- - - Independent Model— -Wave Model
Figure 13. Comparison of Simulation versus Analytical Models for Fixed
Level of Three Aircraft.
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C. CASE COMPARISON
As mentioned earlier there are four cases used in this thesis. Each simulation case
uses the same set of input parameters as provided in Table 6. When decoy TELs are
included (cases 2 and 4), the level of decoys is fixed at 10. UGS networks are fixed at 200
in cases 3 and 4. Three-dimensional surface plots for all comparison cases are provided as
Appendix B.
Component Associated Parameters Value
Attack Aircraft Number of Attack Aircraft 1 to 9 by 2
Location ofCV (x, y) (100.0,325.0)
Probability of Kill 0.9
Attack Velocity 400 mph
Attack Radius 10m
On Station Time 2hrs
Turn Around Time 3hrs
Estimated TEL Speed 25 mph
UGS Network Sensor Range 1.25 m
Number of Sensor Networks 200 (Case 3 & 4)
TELs Number ofTELs 1 to 19 by 3
Normal Speed 15 mph
Evasion Speed 25 mph
Hiding Time Parameters (4.0, 8.0, 12.0) hrs
Reloading Time Parameters (1.0, 2.0, 3.0) hrs
Minimum Number of Logistic Bases 1
Logistic Base Factor 5
TEL Decoys Number of Decoys 10 (Case 2 & 4)
Normal Speed 15 mph
Operating Area Range of Boundaries 200 x 200 miles
Number of Days in Prehostility Phase 7 days
Table 6. Input Parameters for Comparison Cases 1-4.
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1. Case 1 versus Case 2
This comparison is between two Cases where the difference lies in the presence of
decoy TELs in the simulation. Case 1 is the base Case throughout all future comparisons as
it has neither decoy TELs nor a UGS network. Figure 14 shows the expected survival time
for Case 1 and Case 2 for aircraft fixed at three. One would expect that the presence of
deception would cause an increase in the survival time as Figure 14 illustrates. It is
interesting to note that the effect is fairly constant across the number of TELs. Also of note
is the decreasing marginal return in the expected survival time for additional TEL assets.
Case 1, Decoys, UGS vs Case 2, 10 Decoys, UGS
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Number of TELs
—
.— Casel Case 2
Figure 14. Expected Survival Time. Case 1 versus Case 2.
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Figure 1 5 presents the comparison of the expected number of launches. As in the
previous section, there is a payoff for additional TELs in theater. Another observation is that
the presence of decoys seems to have a greater effect with more TELs present. Recall that
these decoys are indistinguishable from real TELs. Thus they fulfill their designed purpose
of "asset sponges." This is a theme that will surface in all the comparisons. A revolution
in military affairs that increases an opponent's ability to deceive reduces the advantage U.S.
forces seek by improving our own technology.
Case 1, Decoys, UGS vs Case 2, 10 Decoys, UGS
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Figure 15. Expected Number of Launches, Case 1 versus Case 2.
What options are open to U.S. forces to counter the TELs of this simulation? The
concept of increasing performance while decreasing the number of assets is in contrast with
the information provided by Figures 16 and 17. These charts are a cross-sectional view of
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the results presented in Appendix B with the number ofTELs fixed at seven. There are two
areas of interest that these graphs bring to light. The first is that as the number of aircraft in
the scenario is decreased there is an increasing marginal return to the TELs for both survival
time and number of launches. It is also worth noting that both survival time and number of
launches are greater for case 2 (when decoys TELs are present); this is not a surprising
result. The effect of this increase is diminished as more aircraft are introduced into the
simulation. The tradeoffs between increased capability and increased numbers of forces is
an important area for further research, and are not resolvable within the confines of this
thesis effort. The impact of deception upon the aircraft system performance begins to shed
light on the potential weakness of a nation blindly following the road of technology.
Case 1, Decoys, UGS vs Case 2, 10 Decoys, UGS






Case 1 Case 2
Figure 16. Expect Survival Time, Case 1 versus Case 2. The perspective
is for a fixed number ofTELs at seven and increasing aircraft.
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Figure 17. Expected Number of Launches, Case 1 versus Case 2.
2. Case 3 versus Case 4
Case 3 and Case 4 are used to provide insight into the ability of deception to benefit
TEL forces when aircraft receive real-time cueing from a UGS network. Figure 1 8 displays
a graph ofthe expected survival time. Again deception has the ability to extend the conflict
even with the capabilities in accordance with the DBA concept. Figure 1 9 provides another
view of the expected number of launches from the simulation. The TELs of Case 4 have an
increased ability to launch TBMs. It is also important to note that there is still an increasing
marginal return for the addition of more TEL assets even with a sensor network. This again
reenforces the notion that one response any nation has to remain a threat even in the face of
advancing technology is to obtain larger numbers of forces.
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Case 3, Decoys, 200 UGS vs Case 4, 10 Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 18. Expected Survival Time, Case 3 versus Case 4.
Case 3, Decoys, 200 UGS vs Case 4, 10 Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 19. Expected Number of Launches, Case 3 versus Case 4.
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3. Case 1 versus Case 3
Although the previous discussion seems to downplay the importance of having a
UGS network, the comparison of Case 1 to Case 3 shows the potential of such a system.
Figure 20 provides the simulation results for the expected survival time. The 200 UGS
system locations provide only a 2.5 percent increase in the area covered but reduce the
survival time by about 50 percent in the case of 19 TELs. This lends credence to the
acquisition and the use ofUGSs in support of attack operations. Figure 21 is a graph ofthe
expected number of launches. Again the UGS network has reduced the number ofTBMs
launched in theater. The functional form of the expected number of launch curve still
exhibits an increasing marginal return for the addition of TELs in the Op Area.
Case 1, Decoys, UGS vs Case 3, Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 20. Expected Survival Time, Case 1 versus Case 3.
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Case 1, Decoys, UGS vs Case 3, 10 Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 21. Expected Number ofLaunches, Case 1 versus Case 3.
4. Case 2 Versus Case 4
The final direct comparison is brought forward for additional emphasis on the themes
highlighted previously. Figures 22 and 23 display the results of the simulation for Case 2,
in which decoy TELs are present without a UGS network, and Case 4, where both decoy
TELs and a 200-location UGS network are included. The presence of the UGS network has
the same effect as before: a reduction in survival time and number of launches, but the
curves have the same functional form.
5. Inclusive Comparison
Figures 24 and 25 incorporate the results for each MOE. The results of all four Cases
are presented together to summarize the general results discussed in this section. The benefit
of deception for TEL forces is easily seen, as is the effect of a UGS network capability.
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Case 2, 10 Decoys, UGS vs Case 4, 10 Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 22. Expected Survival Time, Case 2 versus Case 4.
Case 2, 10 Decoys, UGS vs Case 4, 10 Decoys, 200 UGS
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Figure 23. Expected Number of Launches, Case 2 versus Case 4.
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Cases 1 - 4
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Figure 24. Expected Survival Time, Cases 1-4.
Case 1 - 4
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This thesis attempted to shed light on the effects that certain products of a revolution
in military affairs would have upon both U.S. forces and the forces of any potential
adversary. The methodology for this study began with the development of a wartime
scenario based on attack operations. A simulation was constructed in accordance with a
unique set of stylized assumptions. The simulation assumed technological improvements
to TEL employment capabilities and applied the concept of dominant battlespace awareness
to U.S. forces through the introduction ofUGS assets. The results of the simulation are
obviously dependent on the simulation formulation itself, and thus are not presented as
predictions, but have been used to highlight several important trends.
The predominant assertion of most writings on the subject of revolutions in military
affairs that this author has reviewed tends to focus on the benefits of promoting this
revolution to U.S. forces. I also believe that this same revolution holds promise for other
nations, and that to ignore this fact may have consequences yet unseen. Although dependent
on the stylized assumptions and parameters ofthe simulation, the TBM campaigns could be
loosely judged a success. The advanced support network required for today's TELs to
operate in the same fashion is not an unrealistic capability.
Deception techniques have always been used in warfare. As the U.S. commits to
more and more weapons using increased levels of technology, those concerned with military
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affairs should screen pronouncements of capability against potential deception techniques.
Although not specifically addressed in this thesis, deception by means of new technologies
may provide our opponents with opportunity for success in war.
Another conclusion which may be drawn from this thesis supports the precept of
dominant battlespace awareness. The unattended ground sensor system modeled in the
simulation provides an enhanced capability to conduct attack operations. The general
performance of the simulation in this regard is certainly expected. The UGS network,
although stationary, is an addition of sensors at no "cost" to the simulation. That is, the
sensors provided extra information, in real time, to aircraft which were using the same search
methodology whether sensors were there or not.
Finally, although not precisely quantified, the simulation behaved in accordance with
another general rule of warfare: force ratios matter. As the number of TELs increased, the
TEL forces were able to launch TBMs at an increasing rate. The addition of more aircraft
provided the only counter to this trend. The notion that even a technologically advanced
system will suffer when faced with large numbers of targets certainly seems intuitive.
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B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
There are many additional areas for further research suggested by this thesis. Those
items introduced previously are reiterated here for additional emphasis:
• Investigating improved search tactics for attack aircraft supported by unattended
ground sensors.
• Exploring the effect ofbomb damage assessment on attack operations.
• Analysis of tradeoffs between attack operation capabilities and force sizes.
There are several more themes worth mentioning. The first is that the basic scenario
of attack aircraft searching for TELs was simulated in a stylized fashion. Any of the core
assumptions (the modeling ofUGS networks as a "cookie cutter" detector, for example) are
open avenues for exploration. No model captures all the elements of reality. Decisions must
be made as to the essential elements. Research into the criteria that are important to the
modeling of a given warfare scenario certainly serve as a source of a follow-on topic.
There are many new technologies that the United States will incorporate into its
warfare capabilities in the future. This thesis explored the effect a doctrine of deception had
upon a system dependent on a technological capability. Any system of warfare has an
Achilles heel. Timely research exposing a future system's potential weaknesses has merit.
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APPENDIX A. PROLIFERATION OF TBMS
This appendix lists the countries that are known to possess tactical ballistic missiles




































AL HUSAYN, ALL ABBAS, SCUD-B, SS-12, SS-21





21 Libya SS-21, SCUD-B, AL FATAH, LAYTH, FROG-7
22 Netherlands LANCE
23 PRC M-7, M-9, M-ll, CSS-2, CSS-1, CSS-5, DF-25
24 PRK NO DONG I, SCUD-B
25 Pakistan HAIFT I, II, & 3
26 Poland SS-21, SCUD-B
27 Romania SCUD-B
28 Russia SS-21, SCUDS A-D, FROG-7, SS-4, SS-12, SS-23
29 S. Africa ARNISTON
30 S. Korea KOR SSM (NHK-1)
31 Saudi Arabia CSS-2
32 Slovakia SS-21, SCUD-B
33 Syria SS-21, SCUD-B
34 UK LANCE
35 USA LANCE, ATACMS
36 Ukraine SS-21, SCUD-B
37 Vietnam SCUD-B
38 Yemen SS-21, SCUD-B, FROG-7
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APPENDIX B. COMPARISON CASE RESULTS
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Figure 26. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Survival Time for Case 1
.
















Figure 27. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Number of Launches for Case 1
.
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Figure 28. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Survival Time for Case 2.






Figure 29. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Number of Launches for Case 2.
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Figure 30. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Survival Time for Case 3.
Case 3, Decoys , 200 UGS
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Figure 3 1 . Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Number of Launches for Case 3.
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Figure 32. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Survival Time for Case 4.





Figure 33. Three-Dimensional Surface Plot of the Expected
Number of Launches for Case 4.
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APPENDIX C. SIMULATION PROGRAM
This appendix contains the computer program used for the simulation. The
simulation was written in MODSIM II®, a modular, object-oriented simulating language.
Each of the modules is presented as a separate section with the section title reflecting the




FROM System IMPORT System;
FROM SimMod IMPORT StartSimulation;
FROM UtilMod IMPORT DateTime;
VAR









ASK System TO SetParameters(TELs,Decoys,Air,UGS);
FOR Runs := 1 TO System.NumberRuns
TELL System TO StartCampaign;
StartSimulation;
ASK System TO ResetCampaign;
END FOR;
ASK System TO OutputReport;
ASK System TO Reset;
END FOR;
END FOR;

























Velocity , StartTime : REAL;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
ASK METHOD SetPosition (IN Location : PointType);
ASK METHOD SetDestination (IN Location : PointType);
ASK METHOD Distance (IN Pl,P2:PointType; OUT D: REAL);
ASK METHOD ChangeVelocity (IN NewVelocity : REAL);





FROM MathMod IMPORT SQRT;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime;










































= PI .XCoordinate - P2.XCoordinate;
= PI .YCoordinate - P2.YCoordinate;
= SQRT(X*X+Y*Y);
END METHOD;





ASK METHOD CalcPosit (IN Time : REAL; INOUT Posit : PointType)
;
VAR
TimePassage, DeltaX, DeltaY, D : REAL;
BEGIN
TimePassage:= Time - StartTime;
IF TimePassageo 0.0
IF (Destination.XCoordinateo CurrentPosition.XCoordinate) AND
(Destination.YCoordinateo CurrentPosition.YCoordinate)
DeltaX := Destination.XCoordinate - CurrentPosition.XCoordinate;
ASK SELF Distance (CurrentPosition,Destination,D);
DeltaX := DeltaX / D;
DeltaX := DeltaX * Velocity * TimePassage;
Posit.XCoordinate := CurrentPosition.XCoordinate + DeltaX;
DeltaY := Destination.YCoordinate - CurrentPosition.YCoordinate;
DeltaY := DeltaY / D;
DeltaY := DeltaY * VelocityTimePassage;















{This module and the accompanying implementation module were first constructed as part of an assignment
during OA3302, Modeling and Simulation. As part of the thesis the author's original work was modified to
adhere to the assignment solution guide.}
TYPE
StatObj = OBJECT
Sum, SumOfSquares, Min, Max : REAL;
N : INTEGER;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
ASK METHOD GetSample (IN X : REAL); {Adds a new observation}
ASK METHOD Mean() : REAL; {Returns the mean of the sample}
ASK METHOD Variance() : REAL; {Returns the Variance of the sample}
ASK METHOD StdDev() : REAL; {Returns the Std. Dev. of the sample}
ASK METHOD CIHalfWidth() : REAL; {Gives half-width of CI}
ASK METHOD Output; {Output report of all statistics}





IMPLEMENTATION MODULE SimpIeStats ;






ASK METHOD GetSample(IN X: REAL); {Adds a new observation}
BEGIN
Sum := Sum + X ;
SumOfSquares := SumOfSquares + X * X
;
Min := MINOF (Min, X);
Max := MAXOF (Max, X);
N:=N+1;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD Mean () : REAL; {Returns the mean of the sample}
BEGIN
RETURN ( Sum / FLOAT(N) );
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD Variance() : REAL; {Returns the Variance of the sample}
BEGIN
IFN>1






ASK METHOD StdDev() : REAL; {Returns the Std. Dev. of the sample}
BEGIN
RETURN SQRT( Variance() );
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD CIHalfWidth() : REAL; {Gives width of CI}
BEGIN
IFN>1







ASK METHOD Output; {Output report of all statistics}
VAR
theLower, theUpper : REAL;
BEGIN
OUTPUT ("N Min Max Mean Variance CI Halfwidth");
OUTPUT (N, " ", Min, " ", Max, " ", Mean(), " ", Variance(), " ", CIHalfWidth() );
END METHOD;

















CampaignTime, NumberLaunches, TimeHidden, TimeMoving : StatObj;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
ASK METHOD Echolnput;













FROM OpArea IMPORT OpArea;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime, ResetSimTime;

















OUTPUT ("Number ofRuns = ".NumberRuns);
OUTPUT ("Days in PreHostility Phase - ",TRUNC(PreHostile/24.0));
ASK OpArea TO Echolnput;
ASK SquadronCO TO Echolnput;
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Expected Time Hidden = ",ASK TimeHidden Mean());
OUTPUT ("Expected Time Moving = ",ASK TimeMoving Mean());
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetParameters(IN TELs, Decoys, Air, UGS : INTEGER);
BEGIN
ASK OpArea TO SetParameters(TELs, Decoys);








ASK SquadronCO TO StartSearching;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD ResetCampaign; {This is for a reset between campaign runs}
BEGIN
ResetSimTime(O.O);
ASK OpArea TO ResetCampaign;
ASK SquadronCO TO ResetCampaign;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD Reset; {This is for a reset before a change ofparameters}
BEGIN
ASK CampaignTime TO Reset;
ASK NumberLaunches TO Reset;
ASK OpArea TO Reset;




OUTPUT (ASK OpArea NumberTELs," ",ASK OpArea NumberDecoys," ",
ASK SquadronCO NumberAircraft," ",ASK SquadronCO NumberSensors,"
",
ASK CampaignTime Mean()," ",ASK CampaignTime Variance()," ",
ASK CampaignTime CIHalfWidth()," ", ASK NumberLaunches Mean()," ",















FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM Moving IMPORT MovingObj, PointType;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
TYPE
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Alive, Hidden : BOOLEAN;
ASK METHOD ObjTerminate;
ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN Type : UnitType; IN Numl : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD ID: INTEGER;
TELL METHOD ConductMission;
TELL METHOD MoveTo (IN There : PointType);






NumberTELs, NumberDecoys, TargetsKilled, Launch, NumberBases,
MinNumberBases, BaseFactor : INTEGER;




BaseList : ARRAY INTEGER OF PointType;
AveSpeed, EvasionSpeed, LoWaitTime, MeanWaitTime, HiWaitTime,
LoReloadTime, MeanReloadTime, HiReloadTime,
MinX, MaxX, MinY, MaxY : REAL;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
ASK METHOD ObjTerminate;
ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN TELs, Decoys : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD Echolnput;
ASK METHOD MakeBaseList (IN Numl : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD PickBase(INOUT Location:PointType);
ASK METHOD GetCoordinate(INOUT Location :PointType);
ASK METHOD PickSpeed (IN Mean: REAL) : REAL;












FROM Moving IMPORT PointType;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime, Interrupt;
FROM System IMPORT System;
FROM BlueForce IMPORT SquadronCO;








































ASK SELF TO ChangeVelocity
(ASK OpArea TO PickSpeed (ASK OpArea AveSpeed));
ASK OpArea TO GetCoordinate (Location);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (Location);
IF SimTimeO > ASK System FreHostile
ASK SquadronCO TO DetermineDetections (SELF);
END IF;
ASK SELF Distance (CurrentPosition, Destination, D);
WAIT DURATION (D / Velocity);
ON INTERRUPT
DISPOSE (Location);
ASK System.TimeMoving TO GetSample (SimTime() - StartTime);
TERMINATE;
END WAIT;
ASK System.TimeMoving TO GetSample (SimTime ) - StartTime);
ASK SELF TO SetPosition (Location);
Hidden "TRUE;
ASK SquadronCO TO StopDetection (ASK SELF SerialNumber);
StartTime:=SimTime();
WAIT DURATION ASK OpArea.WaitingTime Triangular




ASK System.TimeHidden TO GetSample (SimTime() - StartTime);
IF SimTimeO > ASK System PreHostile
ASK OpArea TO CountLaunch;
END IF;
ASK OpArea TO PickBase (Location);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (Location);
ASK SELF TO ChangeVelocity
(ASK OpArea TO PickSpeed (ASK OpArea EvasionSpeed));
IF SimTimeO > ASK System PreHostile
ASK SquadronCO TO DetermineDetections (SELF);
END IF;
ASK SELF Distance (CurrentPosition,Destination, D);
StartTime := SimTimeO;
WAIT DURATION (D / Velocity);
ON INTERRUPT
DISPOSE (Location);
ASK System.TimeMoving TO GetSample (SimTimeO - StartTime);
TERMINATE;
END WAIT;
ASK System.TimeMoving TO GetSample (SimTimeO - StartTime);
Hidden:=TRUE;
ASK SELF TO SetPosition (Location);
ASK SquadronCO TO StopDetection (ASK SELF SerialNumber);
StartTime:=SimTime();
WAIT DURATION ASK OpArea.ReloadTime Triangular




ASK System.TimeHidden TO GetSample (SimTime() - StartTime);
Hidden:=FALSE;
DISPOSE (Location);
TELL SELF TO ConductMission;
END IF;"
END METHOD;





IF (Alive) AND (ASK OpArea Hostile)
StartTime := SimTime();
NEW(Location);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (There);
IF SimTimeO > ASK System PreHostile
ASK SquadronCO TO DetermineDetections (SELF);
END IF;
ASK SELF Distance (CurrentPosition, There, D);





ASK SELF TO SetPosition (There);
ASK OpArea TO GetCoordinate (Location);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (Location);
ASK SquadronCO TO StopDetection (ASK SELF SerialNumber);
DISPOSE(Location);
ASK SELF TO ChangeVelocity
(ASK OpArea TO PickSpeed (ASK OpArea AveSpeed));
TELL SELF TO MoveTo (Destination);
END IF;
END METHOD;











ASK SELF TO CalcPosit (Time, Location);
Alive:=FALSE;
ASK SELF TO SetPosition (Location);
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ASK SELF TO SetDestination (ASK SELF CurrentPosition);

















ASK XCoord TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (2));
ASK YCoord TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (8));
ASK WaitingTime TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (9));
ASK ReloadTime TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (6));
ASK RandomSpeed TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (7));




























FOR Count := 1 TO ASK VehicleList numberln







OUTPUT ("Number ofDecoys = ", NumberDecoys);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Normal Vehicle Speed = ", AveSpeed);
OUTPUT ("Vehicle Evansion Speed = ", EvasionSpeed);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Lower Bound for Mean Wait Time ", LoWaitTime);
OUTPUT ("Mean Wait Time ", MeanWaitTime);
OUTPUT ("Upper Bound for Mean Wait Time ", HiWaitTime);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Lower Bound for Mean Reload Time ", LoReloadTime);
OUTPUT ("Mean Reload Time ", MeanReloadTime);
OUTPUT ("Upper Bound for Mean Reload Time ", HiReloadTime);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Minimum Number of Bases = ", MinNumberBases);
OUTPUT ("Logistic Base Factor = ", BaseFactor);
OUTPUT 0;
OUTPUT ("X Range ", MinX, " ", MaxX);
OUTPUT ("Y Range ", MinY, " ", MaxY);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN TELs, Decoys:INTEGER);
VAR
Vehicle : VehicleObj;








ASK SELF TO MakeBaseList (NumberTELs);
FOR Count := 1 TO NumberTELs
NEW (Vehicle);
ASK Vehicle TO SetParameters (TEL, Count);





FOR Count := (Total + 1) TO (Total + NumberDecoys)
NEW (Vehicle);
ASK Vehicle TO SetParameters (Decoy, Count);








NumberBases := (Numl DIV BaseFactor) + MinNumberBases;
NEW(BaseList, 1 ..NumberBases);
FOR Count := 1 TO NumberBases
NEW (BaseList[Count]);
ASK SELF TO GetCoordinate (BaseList[Count]);
END FOR;
END METHOD;








ASK METHOD GetCoordinate (INOUT Location : PointType);
BEGIN
Location.XCoordinate := ASK XCoord UniformReal (MinX, MaxX);
Location.YCoordinate := ASK YCoord UniformReal (MinY, MaxY);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD PickSpeed (IN Mean: REAL) : REAL;
BEGIN
RETURN (ASK RandomSpeed Triangular (Mean*.9, Mean, Mean* 1.1));
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD DestroyTarget (IN Time : REAL; IN Target : VehicleObj);
BEGIN
ASK Target TO Explode (Time);
IF ASK Target ID <= NumberTELs
INC(TargetsKilled);
END IF;
IF TargetsKilled = NumberTELs
Hostile := FALSE;
ASK System.CampaignTime TO GetSample (SimTime() - ASK System PreHostile);









FOREACH Vehicle IN VehicleList;
IF ASK Vehicle Class = TEL
NEW(Location);
ASK SELF TO PickBase (Location);
ASK Vehicle TO SetPosition (Location);
DISPOSE (Location);
TELL Vehicle TO ConductMission;
ELSE
NEW(Location);
ASK SELF TO GetCoordinate (Location);
ASK Vehicle TO SetPosition (Location);
ASK SELF TO GetCoordinate (Location);
ASK Vehicle TO SetDestination (Location);
DISPOSE (Location);
ASK Vehicle TO ChangeVelocity (ASK SELF TO PickSpeed (AveSpeed));
















FOREACH Vehicle IN VehicleList
ASK Vehicle TO Reset;
END FOREACH;
FOR Count:=l TO NumberBases









FOR Count := 1 TO ASK VehicleList numberln
Vehicle := ASK VehicleList TO Remove ();
DISPOSE (Vehicle);
END FOR;









FROM Moving IMPORT MovingObj, PointType, PathObj;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
FROM OpArea IMPORT VehicIeObj;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM HomeBase IMPORT AircraftObj;
TYPE
CommanderObj = OBJECT
NumberAircraft, NumberSensors : INTEGER;
ProbKill, MeanAttackVelocity, AttackRadius, OnStaTime,
TurnAroundTime, Range, EstTELspeed : REAL;
AttackValue, Direction, RemoteX, RemoteY,
RandomSearchX, RandomSearchY : RandomObj;







ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN Air, UGS : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD GetCoordinate (INOUT Location : PointType);
ASK METHOD Distance (IN PI, P2 : PointType; OUT D: REAL);




ASK METHOD DetermineDetections (IN Launcher : VehicIeObj);
ASK METHOD StopDetection (IN Number : INTEGER);
END OBJECT;
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TargetObj = OBJECT (PathObj)
{Time and Where}
{GetPoint and PrintPoint}










ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN Numl : INTEGER; IN Num2 : REAL);
ASK METHOD SetLocation (IN Loco : PointType);
ASK METHOD SetDetection (IN Time : REAL; IN Number : INTEGER);
TELL METHOD ReportDetection (IN Time: REAL);







FROM OpArea IMPORT OpArea, VehicleObj;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime, InterruptMethod;
FROM HomeBase IMPORT AircraftObj;
FROM Moving IMPORT PointType;
FROM System IMPORT System;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
FROM MathMod IMPORT SQRT;





ASK AttackValue TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (7));
NEW (Direction);
ASK Direction TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (4));
NEW (RemoteX);
NEW (RemoteY);
ASK RemoteX TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (2));
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ASK RemoteY TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (9));
NEW (RandomSearchX);
ASK RandomSearchX TO SetSeed (FetchSeed (5));
NEW (RandomSearchY);
























FOR Count:= 1 TO ASK Wave numberln
ASK Squadron TO Add (ASK Wave TO Remove());
END FOR;
FOREACH FA 18 IN Squadron
ASK FA 18 TO Reset;
END FOREACH;
FOREACH Remote IN RemoteQueue
ASK Remote TO Reset;
END FOREACH;
FOR Count := 1 TO ASK TargetSet numberln













FOR Count := 1 TO ASK Wave numberln
FA 18 := ASK Wave TO Remove();
DISPOSE (FA 18);
END FOR;
FOR Count := 1 TO NumberAircraft
FA18:=ASK Squadron TO Remove();
DISPOSE (FA 18);
END FOR;
FOR Count := 1 TO NumberSensors
Remote := ASK RemoteQueue TO Remove();
DISPOSE (Remote);
END FOR;
FOR Count := 1 TO ASK TargetSet numberln



















FOR Count := 1 TO ASK Wave numberln




FOR Count := 1 TO ASK Squadron numberln




FOR Count := 1 TO ASK RemoteQueue numberln




FOR Count := 1 TO ASK TargetSet numberln














FOR Count := 1 TO NumberAircraft;
NEW (FA 18);
ASK FA 18 TO SetParameters
(Count,ProbKill,AttackRadius,OnStaTime,TumAroundTime,CarrierPosit);
ASK FA 18 TO ChangeVelocity (MeanAttackVelocity);
ASK FA 18 TO SetPosition (CarrierPosit);
ASK Squadron TO Add (FA 18);
END FOR;
FOR Count := 1 TO NumberSensors
NEW(Remote);
ASK Remote TO SetParameters (Count,Range);
ASK RemoteQueue TO Add (Remote);
END FOR;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD GetCoordinate (INOUT Location : PointType);
BEGIN
Location.XCoordinate :=
ASK RemoteX UniformReal (ASK OpArea MinX, ASK OpArea MaxX);
Location.YCoordinate :=





OUTPUT ("Prob of Kill = ", ProbKill);
OUTPUT ("CV Location ", CarrierPosit.XCoordinate, " ", CarrierPosit.YCoordinate);
OUTPUT ("Mean Velocity = ", MeanAttackVelocity);
OUTPUT ("Attack Radius = ", AttackRadius);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("On Station Time = ", OnStaTime);
OUTPUT ("Turn Around Time = ", TurnAroundTime);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Estimated TEL speed = ", EstTELspeed);
OUTPUT ();
OUTPUT ("Number ofRemote Sensors = ", NumberSensors);
OUTPUT ("Range of Sensors = ", Range);
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END METHOD;
ASK METHOD Distance (IN PI, P2 : PointType; OUTD: REAL);
VAR
X, Y : REAL;
BEGIN
X:=Pl.XCoordinate- P2.XCoordinate;
Y := PLYCoordinate •- P2.YCoordinate;
D := SQRT(X*X + Y 1*Y);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD DetermineAssignment (IN Point : PointType);
VAR




Dl := MAX (REAL);
FOREACH FA 18 IN Wave
ASK SELF Distance (ASK FA 18 Destination, Point, D2);
Dl ~MINOF(Dl,D2);
END FOREACH;
ASK SELF Distance (Point, CarrierPosit, D2);
IFD1 <D2;
FOREACH FA 18 IN Wave
ASK SELF Distance (ASK FA 18 Destination, Point, D2);
IFD1=D2;





ASK VirtualTarget TO GetPoint (SimTime(), Point);
DISPOSE(Point);
ASK TargetSet TO Add (VirtualTarget);








WHILE (ASK Squadron numberln > 0)
Plane := ASK Squadron TO Remove();
NEW(Point);
Point.XCoordinate :=
ASK RandomSearchX UniformReal (ASK OpArea MinX, ASK OpArea MaxX);
Point.YCoordinate :=
ASK RandomSearchY UniformReal (ASK OpArea MinY, ASK OpArea MaxY);
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ASK Plane TO SetDestination (Point);
DISPOSE (Point);










D , TravelTime, MaxR: REAL;
BEGIN
IF ASK Squadron numberln > {Don't do anything if squadron empty}
IF ASK TargetSet numberlno
{***More Targets than aircraft***}
IF ASK TargetSet numberln > ASK Squadron numberln
WHILE (ASK Squadron numberln > 0) AND (ASK TargetSet numberln > 0)
Plane := ASK Squadron TO RemoveO;
VirtualTarget := ASK TargetSet TO Remove();
NEW(Point);
ASK VirtualTarget TO GiveCoordinates(Point);
ASK SELF Distance (Point, CarrierPosit, D);
TravelTime := (D / ASK Plane Velocity);
MaxR := (SimTime() + TravelTime - ASK VirtualTarget Time)
* EstTELspeed;
DISPOSE (VirtualTarget);
IF MaxR > ASK Plane SearchRadius
ASK Squadron TO Add (Plane);
ELSE
ASK Plane TO SetDestination(Point);





{***More Aircraft than Targets***}
WHILE (ASK TargetSet numberln > 0) AND (ASK Squadron numberln > 0)
Plane := ASK Squadron TO Remove();
VirtualTarget := ASK TargetSet TO Remove();
NEW(Point);
ASK VirtualTarget TO GiveCoordinates (Point);
ASK SELF Distance (Point,CarrierPosit,D);
TravelTime := (D / ASK Plane Velocity);
MaxR := (SimTime() + TravelTime - ASK VirtualTarget Time)
* EstTELspeed;
DISPOSE(VirtualTarget);
IF MaxR > ASK Plane SearchRadius
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ASK Squadron TO Add (Plane);
ELSE
ASK Plane TO SetDestination (Point);





ASK SELF TO AssignRandomSearch; {for any leftovers}
ELSE (Executes ifno targets in target set}
ASK SELF TO AssignRandomSearch;
END IF; {for targetset check}







FOREACH Remote IN RemoteQueue
NEW (Location);
ASK SELF TO GetCoordinate (Location);
ASK Remote TO SetLocation (Location);
DISPOSE (Location);
END FOREACH;
{Airplanes begin to search regardless ofnumber ofUGS}
ASK SELF TO AssignTargets;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD DetermineDetections (IN Launcher : VehicleObj);
VAR
Xi, Xj, Vnorm, Vi, Vj, Ui, Uj, Xnorm, rad, tdl, time : REAL;
Remote : SensorObj;
BEGIN
FOREACH Remote IN RemoteQueue
{Relative Space}
Xi := ASK Launcher CurrentPosition.XCoordinate -
ASK Remote Location.XCoordinate;
Xj := (ASK Launcher CurrentPosition.YCoordinate) -
(ASK Remote Location.YCoordinate);
{Unit Vector for Target}
Distance (ASK Launcher CurrentPosition, ASK Launcher Destination, Vnorm);
Vi := ASK Launcher Destination.XCoordinate -
ASK Launcher CurrentPosition.XCoordinate;
Vj := ASK Launcher Destination.YCoordinate -
ASK Launcher CurrentPosition.YCoordinate;
Ui := Vi / Vnorm;




IF Xnorm <= ASK Remote Range
tdl:=0.0;
ASK Remote TO SetDetection (tdl, ASK Launcher SerialNumber);
ELSE
rad := (ASK Remote Range * ASK Remote Range) - (Xnorm * Xnorm) +
((Ui*Xi + Uj*Xj)*(Ui*Xi + Uj*Xj));
IF rad > 0.0
tdl:=( ((-Ui*Xi)+(-Uj*Xj)) - SQRT(rad) ) / ASK Launcher Velocity;
IF tdl > 0.0










FOREACH Remote IN RemoteQueue






















FOR Count := 1 TO (ASK OpArea NumberTELs + ASK OpArea NumberDecoys);




















ASK METHOD SetDetection (IN Time : REAL; IN Number : INTEGER);
BEGIN
Detectionlnfo[Number] := TELL SELF TO ReportDetection (Time);
END METHOD;












ASK SquadronCO TO DetermineAssignment (Temp);
END METHOD;









FROM Moving IMPORT MovingObj, PointType;
FROM OpArea IMPORT VehicleObj;
FROM ListMod IMPORT QueueList;
TYPE
AircraftObj = OBJECT (MovingObj);
SerialNumber : INTEGER;
CV : PointType;
ProbKill, SearchRadius, OnStaTime, TumAroundTime, PreviousAngle : REAL;
GoToList :QueueList;
ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN Number : INTEGER; IN Pk, R, St, Tt : REAL;
IN Point:PointType);
TELL METHOD FlyTo (IN There : PointType);
ASK METHOD GetRandomDestination
(IN Location : PointType; OUT Point :PointType);
ASK METHOD Search : VehicleObj;
ASK METHOD Attack (IN Target : VehicleObj; INOUT Continue : BOOLEAN);
TELL METHOD AttackTarget;
ASK METHOD ReceiveAssignment (IN Point : PointType);
ASK METHOD ObjTerminate;
ASK METHOD Reset;







FROM Moving IMPORT PointType;
FROM BlueForce IMPORT SquadronCO;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime;
FROM System IMPORT System;
FROM OpArea IMPORT OpArea, VehicleObj;
FROM MathMod IMPORT SQRT, COS, SIN, pi;















FOR Count := 1 TO ASK GoToList numberln
Point:=ASK GoToList TO RemoveO;
DISPOSE (Point);
END FOR;
ASK SELF TO SetPosition (CV);










FOR Count := 1 TO ASK GoToList numberln





ASK METHOD SetParameters (IN Number : INTEGER; IN Pk, R St, Tt : REAL;















ASK SELF TO SetDestination (There);
ASK SELF Distance (CurrentPosition, Destination, D);
WAIT DURATION (D / Velocity);
END WAIT;
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ASK SELF TO SetPosition (There);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD GetRandomDestination
(IN Location : PointType; OUT Point : PointType);
VAR
Theta, Upper, Lower, DeltaX, DeltaY : REAL;
BEGIN
Upper := PreviousAngle - (pi / 2.0);
Lower := PreviousAngle + (pi / 2.0);
Theta := ASK SquadronCO.Direction UniformReal (Upper, Lower);
PreviousAngle := Theta;
WHILE PreviousAngle > 2.0 * pi;
PreviousAngle := PreviousAngle - 2.0 * pi;
END WHILE;
DeltaX := 2.0 * SearchRadius * COS(Theta);
DeltaY := 2.0 * SearchRadius * SIN(Theta);
Point.XCoordinate := Location.XCoordinate + DeltaX;
Point.XCoordinate := MINOF (ASK OpArea MaxX, PointXCoordinate);
Point.XCoordinate := MAXOF (ASK OpArea MinX, Point.XCoordinate);
Point.YCoordinate := Location.YCoordinate + DeltaY;
Point.YCoordinate := MINOF (ASK OpArea MaxY, Point.YCoordinate);
Point.YCoordinate := MAXOF (ASK OpArea MinY, Point.YCoordinate);
IF Point.XCoordinate = ASK OpArea MaxX
ASK SELF TO TurnAround ("Right");
END IF;
IF PointXCoordinate = ASK OpArea MinX
ASK SELF TO TurnAround ("Left");
END IF;
IF Point.YCoordinate = ASK OpArea MaxY
ASK SELF TO TurnAround ("Top");
END IF;
IF Point.YCoordinate = ASK OpArea MinY
ASK SELF TO TurnAround ("Bottom");
END IF;
END METHOD;






FOREACH Vehicle IN OpArea.VehicleList
IF ((NOT (ASK Vehicle Hidden)) AND (ASK Vehicle Alive))
NEW (Location);
ASK Vehicle TO CalcPosit (SimTime(), Location);
ASK Vehicle Distance (ASK SELF CurrentPosition, Location, D);
DISPOSE (Location);








ASK METHOD Attack (IN Target : VehicleObj; INOUT Continue : BOOLEAN);
BEGIN
IF Targeto NILOBJ
IF ASK SquadronCOAttackValue UniformReal (0.0, 1.0) < ASK SELF ProbKill
ASK OpArea TO DestroyTarget (SimTime(), Target);
END IF;












ASK SquadronCO.Wave TO Add(SELF);





ASK SELF TO Attack (ASK SELF TO Search, Continue);
WHILE Continue;
IF (SimTime() - BeginTime) < OnStaTime
IF ASK GoToList numberln >
NextPoint := ASK GoToList TO Remove();




ASK SELF TO GetRandomDestination (CurrentPosition, NextPoint);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (NextPoint);
DISPOSE (NextPoint);
END IF;
WAIT FOR SELF TO FlyTo (Destination);
END WAIT;






ASK SquadronCO.Wave TO RemoveThis (SELF);
ASK SELF TO SetDestination (CV);
FOR Count := 1 TO ASK GoToList numberln
ASK SquadronCO TO DetermineAssignment (ASK GoToList TO Remove());
END FOR;




ASK SquadronCO.Squadron TO Add (SELF);
IF ASK OpArea Hostile
ASK SquadronCO TO AssignTargets;
END IF;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD ReceiveAssignment (IN Point : PointType);
BEGIN
ASK GoToList TO Add (Point);
END METHOD;







PreviousAngle := (2.0*pi) - PreviousAngle;
OTHERWISE
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